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1 Introduction
There is a large literature on tax compliance following the approach to crime and
punishment developed in Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970). For instance, Reinganum
and Wilde (1985, 1986) examine a static model where taxpayers’ incomes are private in-
formation. Using the costly state verification framework developed by Townsend (1979),
they study optimal verification schemes when the tax and the penalty are exogenously
specified. In this paper, we characterize the optimal auditing and taxation schemes in a
dynamic stochastic costly state verification environment.
We develop a model where the tax authority (principal) is risk neutral and taxpay-
ers (agents) have constant absolute risk-averse preferences. Each agent knows his own
income but it is unobserved by the principal. The principal may audit an agent to ver-
ify his income, but this is costly and imperfect. The tax authority designs an optimal
taxation scheme as well as an optimal auditing scheme to maximize the present value of
revenue net of audit cost. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and receive
stochastic opportunities each period to transit to high income. For convenience, we as-
sume that high income is an absorbing state. Since income is private information, the
taxpayer could conceal the fact that he has transited to high income and evade taxes.
We use a dynamic mechanism-design approach to search for the best tax system and
auditing system within a large family of state contingent contracts.
Our model contains persistent private information and, as demonstrated by Fer-
nandes and Phelan (2000), the principal’s problem contains two state variables: the
continuation utility for an agent who just transited to high income and the continuation
utility for a low-income agent. We follow Zhang (2009) and set up the principal’s prob-
lem in continuous time. We then formulate the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and
use it to study the dynamic behavior of continuation utilities.
Since high income is an absorbing state in our model, the treatment of the agent who
transited to high income is straightforward – constant consumption forever and, hence,
constant continuation utility. Furthermore, he is never audited. However, the principal
has to provide incentives for the low-income agent to truthfully report the transition to
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high income. Since income is private information, the principal would not fully insure
the low-income agent. The distortion in the consumption path for a low-income agent is
a key object of interest. We measure this distortion as the difference between the cost of
providing the continuation utility to the low-income agent and the cost of providing the
same utility using a perfectly smooth consumption path. We show that the distortion
is determined by the ratio of the two state variables noted above.
The auditing technology in our model is imperfect: there is an auditing error that
labels a low-income agent as having high income.1 Our main result is that it is optimal
for the principal to audit the agent periodically. The auditing mechanism in our model
consists of cycles. The low-income agent could be in one of two states: (i) not audited
or (ii) randomly drawn to be audited. Within each cycle, a low-income agent is initially
in the not-audited state. He will be moved into the random audit state if the duration of
his low-income reports exceeds a threshold N , where N is pinned down by the primitives
of the model. If he is randomly drawn to be audited, then he will be moved to the not-
audited state after the audit, and a new cycle begins. If a low-income agent is mislabeled
as having high income, he will be mistakenly punished and will continue to stay in the
random audit state. While auditing is stochastic, the threshold duration N is not. Put
differently, within each cycle the principal guarantees that the agent will not be audited
until the duration N is reached. The intuition for the periodicity is that the benefit of
auditing is increasing with the duration of low-income reports, while the cost of auditing
is constant. Auditing occurs only when the benefit exceeds the cost.
In our model, there are two instruments for providing incentives. One instrument
is dynamic taxation that distorts the consumption path and makes future payoffs con-
tingent on past history of reported incomes. This is the standard instrument used in
dynamic mechanism design. For instance, Green (1987) uses this instrument to provide
incentives for truthful reporting of income by designing taxes and subsidies that are
history dependent. The second instrument is auditing; the principal has to pay a cost
to use the instrument. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service uses the second instrument to
1The principal has access to infinite penalty in our model and can implement the full-information
allocation if auditing reveals the agent’s income without any error.
3
provide incentives for taxpayers to pay their true share of taxes – those who are caught
cheating will be penalized. The principal in our model has access not only to the past
history of reported incomes but also to the history of auditing outcomes and, hence, can
provide better incentives by using both instruments.
To understand the interaction between the two instruments, we study two versions of
the model: one with only the dynamic taxation instrument and the other with both tax-
ation and audit instruments. In the model with only the dynamic taxation instrument,
in order to ensure that the high-income agent does not have the incentive to deviate,
the low-income agent’s consumption path is such that the static gain to the high-income
agent from deviation is small whereas the future losses are large. We show that this
path is highly distorted since it implies a steeply declining consumption profile. We also
show that when the sequence of low-income reports is sufficiently long, the distortion in
the consumption path converges to infinity. In contrast, if the income process was i.i.d.,
as in Green (1987), the distortion is constant.
When the auditing instrument is also available, we show that the principal uses this
instrument to alleviate the distortion in the consumption path implied by the first in-
strument. Auditing reduces the distortion, because when the agent’s income is observed
during the audit, albeit imperfectly, the principal rewards the truth-teller relative to
the cheater. In particular, the principal removes the distortion (accumulated up to the
auditing date) in consumption for the truth-teller. This is not possible when there is
no technology to ever verify who is the truth-teller and who is the cheater. We show
that the optimal mechanism implies a discrete upward jump in the continuation utilities
for the truth-teller after the audit. We also show that no matter how high the cost of
auditing is, there always exists a threshold instant at which the auditing probability
becomes positive.
If the agent’s absolute risk aversion is not constant, then he is audited minimally
when risk aversion is either extremely high or extremely low. When risk aversion is
extremely low, the variation in consumption incurs little cost, thus there is no need to
use the costly auditing instrument to reduce the distortion. When risk aversion is large,
then a small variation in consumption will generate large incentive effects, hence there
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is again no need to use the auditing instrument. The model also implies that as the
variance in income increases auditing occurs more frequently.
In related literature on dynamic costly state verification, Wang (2005) studies de-
terministic auditing with i.i.d. hidden incomes. He finds that there is a critical level
of auditing cost, below which there is auditing and above which there is no auditing.
That is, if it is optimal to audit in one period then it is optimal to audit in every period.
Thus, the auditing in Wang (2005) is a static decision: it only depends on the cost of
auditing and is independent of the past history. In our model, the auditing decision is
dynamic and depends on past history via the duration of low-income reports. Popov
(2007) studies stochastic auditing with i.i.d. hidden incomes. He specifies an exogenous
lower bound for the agent’s continuation utility and every cheater is moved to the lower
bound if caught during the audit. In his model, auditing plays a dynamic role, but
for agents with continuation utility at the lower bound, the auditing instrument is not
effective because the principal cannot punish a liar any more. In our model, there is
no lower bound on continuation utility and the auditing instrument is always effective.
Monnet and Quintin (2005) study stochastic auditing with linear utility and i.i.d. hidden
incomes. They find that auditing will eventually not be used. We study the risk-averse
case, thus consumption distortion plays a central role in our model.
Although we focus on tax compliance in the paper, the issue of fraud and optimal
auditing is applicable to other areas in economics. For instance, a venture capitalist
provides start-up funds to an entrepreneur to invent a new product. In the experimen-
tal stage, the entrepreneur receives outside funding but after the product is invented,
he might have to share the profits with the venture capitalist. If the outcome of the
experiment is private information, then the entrepreneur can delay the report of being
successful, keep the profit by selling the product privately and continue to receive fund-
ing from the venture capitalist. In the problem of infant industry protection, domestic
firms are subsidized for a certain period to help them increase their productivity and
compete with foreign firms. If productivity is private information, the firms have strong
incentives to cheat because they can earn monopoly rents and receive subsidies simulta-
neously. In the context of unemployment insurance, an unemployed worker might find
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a job at a random rate. The exact date when he finds the job might not be observable.
By delaying the report of employment, the worker can receive both wage income and
unemployment benefits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model
without auditing, and shows that the distortion in consumption increases with the du-
ration of low-income reports. In Section 3, we introduce the auditing technology and
show that it is optimal to audit the low-income agent periodically. Then we study the
dependence of auditing frequency on the primitives of the model. Section 4 concludes.
We provide the proofs of all the results in an appendix.
2 Model: No Auditing Technology
In this section we study a hidden income model in which the principal does not
have access to an auditing technology. The characterization of the optimal contract in
this section will help us examine the optimal auditing in Section 3 when an auditing
technology is available.
The tax authority is a risk-neutral principal with a discount rate r > 0. The taxpayer
is a risk-averse agent, whose preferences are given by
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(ct)dt
]
,
where ct is consumption at time t, u(c) = − exp(−ρc) is a constant absolute risk-aversion
(CARA) utility function with risk aversion ρ, r is the discount rate (same as that of the
principal) and E is the expectations operator. Let c : (−∞, 0) → R denote the inverse
of the utility function:
c(u) =
− log(−u)
ρ
. (1)
Agents have either high income, wH , or low income, wL, where wL < wH . All agents
start with low income, and transit to wH with Poisson rate π > 0. For the model to be
tractable, we assume that the high-income state is permanent.2
2Similar simplifying assumption has been made by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) in an unemploy-
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True income is not observable by the principal, so a high-income agent can underre-
port his income and pose as a low-income agent. We assume that the principal always
asks the agent to show his reported income, so the low-income agent can never pretend
to have wH . Hence, there are no incentive constraints when the agent reports wH .
The timing is as follows. In the initial period, the agent receives an income, either
wH or wL. He chooses to report either wH or wL to the principal. The principal assigns
current and future consumptions based on the report. In subsequent periods, if an
agent had reported wH in the past, he is in an absorbing state and no further reports
are necessary. If an agent had reported wL in every period in the past, then he receives
an income, either wH or wL. The sequence of events then is the same as in the initial
period.
The principal commits to delivering two sequences of consumptions,
{ (
cH(s), cL(s)
)
; s ≥
0
}
, where cH(·), cL(·) : [0,∞) → R are measurable functions. We will denote this pre-
commitment contract as σ. If an agent transits to wH at t, efficiency requires that the
agent’s consumption remain constant afterwards. This is because the principal and the
agent have the same discount rate and wH is an absorbing state. We denote this constant
level of consumption as cH(t). The flow utility from this level of consumption then is
ru
(
cH(t)
)
. Let H(t) ≡ u(cH(t)) denote the discounted sum of utilities to an agent who
transits to wH for the first time at t. Note that, since true income is not observable,
H(t) is also the continuation utility to an agent who transited to wH before t but reports
wH for the first time at t. A low-income agent’s consumption at t is denoted by c
L(t)
and his flow utility is uL(t) ≡ u(cL(t)). His continuation utility is
L(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
e−(r+π)(ξ−t)
(
πH(ξ) + ruL(ξ)
)
dξ
=
∫ s
t
e−(r+π)(ξ−t)
(
πH(ξ) + ruL(ξ)
)
dξ + e−(r+π)(s−t)L(s), for all t < s. (2)
We will refer to (2) as promise-keeping constraints.
The incentive compatibility constraint requires that an agent who transited to high
income at t does not have the incentive to delay the report of the transition to a later
ment insurance model and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) in a disability insurance model. We will discuss
in subsection 3.4 how our results might be affected when the high-income state is not permanent.
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time s, i.e., report wL from t to s and report wH from s onwards:
H(t) ≥
∫ s
t
e−r(ξ−t)ru(cL(ξ) + wH − wL)dξ + e
−r(s−t)H(s).
The above constraint can be simplified as follows. CARA utility implies that u(cL(ξ) +
wH − wL) = u(c
L(ξ))|u(wH − wL)|. Define
b ≡ |u(wH − wL)| ∈ (0, 1),
so the incentive constraint can be written as
H(t) ≥
∫ s
t
e−r(ξ−t)rbuL(ξ)dξ + e−r(s−t)H(s). (3)
The expected cost for the principal is
C(σ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πcH(t) + rcL(t)
)
dt.
There should, in fact, be an additional term in C(σ): the discounted income obtained
by the principal, rwL+πwH
r+π
. However, unlike the unemployment insurance literature that
endogenizes job-finding probabilities, the discounted income in our model is a constant,
so it does not affect the optimal σ.
The principal’s problem is to find an incentive compatible (I.C.) σ that delivers a
level of initial utility L0 to a low-income agent and minimizes C(σ), i.e.,
min
σ
C(σ) (4)
s.t. L0 = L(0) ≡
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πH(t) + ruL(t)
)
dt,
and constraint (3) for all t < s.
Next we will obtain a recursive representation of the above problem. The promise-
keeping constraint (2) and the incentive constraint (3) are equivalent to the following
integral equations (5) and (6).
Lemma 1 The promise-keeping constraint (2) and the incentive constraint (3) hold for
all t < s if and only if
L(s)− L(t) =
∫ s
t
(
(r + π)L(ξ)− πH(ξ)− ruL(ξ)
)
dξ, (5)
H(s)−H(t) ≤
∫ s
t
(
rH(ξ)− rbuL(ξ)
)
dξ, (6)
hold for all t < s.
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Equation (5) states that the rate of change of L is r
(
L(t)− uL(t)
)
+ π (L(t)−H(t)),
where the first term is the rate of change of L when there is no uncertainty (i.e., when
there is no transition to the high-income state), and the second term captures the ad-
ditional rate of change due to uncertainty. Inequality (6) plays the role of incentive
constraints by imposing an upper bound on the rate of change of H . Intuitively, a
sharply declining H(·) prevents the agent from delaying the high-income report. If (6)
holds as an equality, then an high-income agent is indifferent between reporting wH at t
and delaying the high-income report until s; if (6) is strict, then delaying the high-income
report makes him strictly worse off.
Following Fernandes and Phelan (2000) and Zhang (2009), we may write the princi-
pal’s problem as a dynamic programming problem with L and H as the state variables,
and with equations (5) and (6) as their laws of motion. With a slight abuse of notation,
denote the principal’s cost function as C(L,H).
Remark 1 We include H in the state variable for incentive reasons. The principal
chooses H(0) freely to minimize cost (i.e., H(0) ∈ argminH C(L(0), H)). In any con-
tinuation contract, however, H is no longer a free variable, because H acts as a threat
utility. Raising H(t) might induce an agent who transited to wH in earlier periods to
postpone the high-income report until t.
Remark 2 The domain of the cost function C(L,H) in the dynamic programming prob-
lem is {(L,H) : L < H < 0}. If L is not strictly below H, then a high-income agent
would pose as a low-income agent and consume more than the low-income agent.
In the rest of this section, we study the optimal contract with no auditing in three
steps. In subsection 2.1, we show a homogeneity property of the cost function C(L,H)
and use it to introduce a measure of consumption distortion. In subsection 2.2, we
use the homogeneity property to obtain a simplified Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
Then we fully characterize the optimal contract by showing that the cost function is
the unique solution to this Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. In subsection 2.3, we
explain why the distortion increases with the duration of low-income reports, which
helps us understand the optimal auditing in Section 3.
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2.1 A Measure of Distortion
Recall that the agent’s utility function belongs to the CARA class. A property of
the utility function is that
− exp
(
−ρ
(
c−
log(α)
ρ
))
= −α exp(−ρc), for all α > 0.
Suppose that a contract σ ≡
{(
cL(t), cH(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
delivers the continuation utility pair
(L,H). Then, a contract
σα ≡
{(
cL(t)−
log(α)
ρ
, cH(t)−
log(α)
ρ
)
; t ≥ 0
}
delivers (αL, αH). The reverse is also true. Further, σ is I.C. if and only if σα is I.C.
Therefore,
{(
cL∗(t), cH∗(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the optimal contract to deliver (L,H) if and only
if
{(
cL∗(t)− log(α)
ρ
, cH∗(t)− log(α)
ρ
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the optimal contract to deliver (αL, αH).
The next lemma states this homogeneity property and will be used to obtain a measure
of distortion.
Lemma 2 The cost function C has the following properties:
(i) (Homogeneity) For any α > 0,
C(αL, αH) = C(L,H)−
log(α)
ρ
. (7)
(ii) (Monotonicity) C(L,H) is weakly decreasing in H.
Recall that c(·) is the inverse of the utility function, so equation (7) is the same as
C(αL, αH) = C(L,H) + c(−α).
We can thus decompose the cost C(L,H) as
C(L,H) = C
(
|L|(−1), |L|
(
−
H
L
))
= C
(
−1,−
H
L
)
+ c(L).
With full information and no incentive constraints, the principal will deliver L to the low-
income agent via a stream of constant consumption, i.e., H(·) = uL(·) = L in problem
(4). Hence the cost of delivering L under full information is c(L). The distortion of
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consumption to the low-income agent in our contract can be measured by the difference
between the cost C(L,H) and the full-information cost c(L):
C(L,H)− c(L) = C
(
−1,−
H
L
)
≡ cˆ(x), (8)
where
x ≡
H
L
and cˆ(x) ≡ C (−1,−x) .
It is helpful to compare the distortion in our model to that in Green (1987). With
i.i.d. incomes, private information and CARA utility, Green (1987) shows that the cost
function implied by the optimal contract differs from the full-information cost function
only by a constant. Thus, the distortion in any continuation contract in the i.i.d. case
is constant. In particular, the distortion is independent of the history, or the level of
evolving continuation utilities. With persistent shocks, the distortion is independent of
the level of the continuation utility L, but depends on the ratio H
L
, as noted in equation
(8). Part (ii) of Lemma 2 implies that the higher the ratio is (i.e., lower H), the higher
the distortion will be.
2.2 The Optimal Contract without Auditing
In this section, we first derive a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the
cost function. Then we conjecture a candidate solution to the HJB equation. Lastly, we
verify that the allocation implied by the candidate solution solves problem (4). The last
step of verifying the optimality of the candidate solution is needed, because the HJB
equation has multiple solutions.
If L(·) and H(·) are differentiable, we can rewrite (5) and (6) as differential equations
and inequalities,
dL(t)
dt
= (r + π)L(t)− πH(t)− ruL(t), (9)
dH(t)
dt
≤ rH(t)− rbuL(t). (10)
Note that we allow for downward jumps in H(·): when H(t) > lims↓tH(s), we interpret
the discontinuity as dH(t)
dt
= −∞, and the differential inequality (10) still holds under
11
this interpretation. Introducing a slack variable µ(t) ≥ 0 in (10), we get
min
σ
C(σ) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H(t)) + rc(uL(t))
)
dt (11)
s.t.
dL(t)
dt
= (r + π)L(t)− πH(t)− ruL(t), (12)
dH(t)
dt
= rH(t)− rbuL(t)− µ(t). (13)
The HJB equation for the cost function C(L,H) is
(r + π)C(L,H) = min
uL,µ
{
CL(L,H)
dL
dt
+ CH(L,H)
dH
dt
+ rc(uL) + πc(H)
}
. (14)
We may simplify (14) by replacing the state (L,H) with (L, x). Equations (12) and
(13) imply that
dx
dt
=
d
(
H
L
)
dt
= r(x− b)
uL
L
+ π(x− 1)x−
µ
L
. (15)
Recall that the homogeneity property allows us to write C(L,H) = c(L) + cˆ(x). The
HJB equation (14) can be written as
(r + π) (c(L) + cˆ(x)) = min
uL,µ
{
c′(L)
dL
dt
+ cˆ′(x)
dx
dt
+ rc(uL) + πc(H)
}
,
which, after rearrangement, becomes
(r + π)cˆ(x) = min
uL,µ
{
−
1
ρ
(r + π)L− πH − ruL
L
+ cˆ′(x)
(
r(x− b)
uL
L
+ π(x− 1)x−
µ
L
)
+rc
(
−
uL
L
)
+ πc
(
−
H
L
)}
.
Introducing uˆL ≡ u
L
L
> 0, µˆ ≡ −µ
L
≥ 0, we get
(r + π)cˆ(x) = min
uˆL,µˆ
{
−
1
ρ
(
r + π − πx− ruˆL
)
+ cˆ′(x)
(
r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x+ µˆ
)
+rc
(
−uˆL
)
+ πc (−x)
}
. (16)
Note that the homogeneity property makes the state space one-dimensional, even though
the state space in (11) contains two dimensions.
Next we make a conjecture to narrow down candidate solutions to (16): there exists
an x∗ ∈ (0, 1), to the left of which cˆ(·) is flat and to the right of which it is strictly
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increasing.3 If we know the optimal contract starting with x(0) = x∗, then the optimal
contract with x(0) < x∗ can be obtained by a discrete jump in the state variable to x∗.
Therefore, we focus on the solution to (16) in [x∗, 1). Because cˆ(·) is strictly increasing
in [x∗, 1), it is optimal to choose µˆ = 0. Hence we can remove µˆ from the right side of
(16) and restrict attention to solutions that are monotonically increasing in x. That is,
we rewrite (16) as
cˆ(x) = H (cˆ′(x), x) and cˆ′(x) ≥ 0, (17)
where
H (d, x) ≡
1
r + π
min
uˆL
{
−
1
ρ
(r + π − πx− ruˆL) + d(r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x)
+rc(−uˆL) + πc(−x)
}
.
In the following, we solve (17) as an initial value problem by expressing cˆ′ as a
function of x and cˆ. We establish the domain for (x, cˆ) by showing some properties of
H in the lemma below.
Lemma 3 (i) H (0, x) decreases in x (see Figure 1).
(ii) Denote the maximizer in maxd≥0 H (d, x) as d¯(x). Then
d¯(x)

 = 0, if x ≤ x,> 0, if x > x,
where x is the unique root in (b, 1) to the equation r(x− b) + π(x− 1)x = 0.4
(iii) If x > x, then H (·, x) is strictly increasing in (0, d¯(x)).
3Because the principal minimizes the cost, it is reasonable to conjecture that cˆ(·) is a convex function.
Let x∗ be the largest minimizer in argminx cˆ(x). Then cˆ(·) is flat on (0, x
∗] for two reasons: (i)
cˆ(x) ≥ cˆ(x∗), ∀x ∈ (0, x∗] because x∗ is a minimizer; (ii) cˆ(x) ≤ cˆ(x∗), ∀x ∈ (0, x∗] because cˆ(·) is
non-decreasing. It is easy to see that cˆ(·) is strictly increasing on [x∗, 1). Convexity implies that cˆ′(x)
is non-decreasing in x. If cˆ′(y) = 0 for some y > x∗, then cˆ′(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ [x∗, y], contradicting the fact
that x∗ is the largest minimizer.
4The quadratic function f(x) ≡ r(x − b) + π(x − 1)x has a unique root in (b, 1) because f(b) < 0
and f(1) > 0. So one root is between b and 1 and the other is below b.
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Part (ii) in Lemma 3 shows that H (0, x) < H (d¯(x), x) if and only if x < x. Define
D as the region between H (0, x) and H (d¯(x), x),
D ≡
{
(x, cˆ) : x < x < 1,H (0, x) < cˆ < H (d¯(x), x)
}
.
For any (x, cˆ) ∈ D, let d∗(x, cˆ) be the inverse of H , that is, the root of H (d, x) = cˆ. It
follows from part (iii) in Lemma 3 that this root exists and is unique in (0, d¯(x)). Thus,
the HJB equation (17) is equivalent to the following initial value problem in D,
cˆ′(x) = d∗(x, cˆ(x)). (18)
To solve (18), we start with the initial condition, (x∗,H (0, x∗)), since cˆ′(x∗) = 0 and
cˆ(x∗) = H (0, x∗). Then the solution curve enters D (see Figure 1) because x∗ > x.5
Because x∗ is unknown a priori, we find a condition to pin down x∗ in the next subsection.
2.2.1 Candidate Solution
Let cˆx0(·) denote the solution to (18) with initial condition (x0,H (0, x0)). Figure 1
shows the solutions for various x0. These solutions are ordered by their function values:
a solution starting with a lower initial value cˆx0(x0) = H (0, x0) remains lower as long
as it resides in D. (Note that lower function value occurs with higher initial state x0.)
There is a unique x∗ such that the solution cˆx
∗
(·) stays in D forever. We call cˆx
∗
(·) the
candidate solution. We will verify that the allocation implied by the candidate solution
is indeed optimal in subsection 2.2.2. If a solution is lower than cˆx
∗
(·), then the solution
curve reaches the upper limit of the domain at 1. This is inappropriate because no
contract can deliver equal continuation utilities to both types (i.e., 1 cannot be in the
domain of cˆ(·)). If a solution is higher than cˆx
∗
(·), then it rises too rapidly and crosses
the upper boundary H (d¯(·), ·), which is also inappropriate as cˆ(x) ≤ maxd≥0 H (d, x).
We prove these results in the following lemma.
5It is easy to see that x∗ exceeds x; otherwise, since cˆ(x) increases and H (d¯(x), x) decreases in x
(because it coincides with H (0, x) when x ≤ x; see parts (i) and (ii) in Lemma 3), the function cˆ(x)
exceeds H (d¯(x), x) immediately after x∗, which violates the HJB equation.
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(d¯(x), x)
(0, x)
c
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D
x x∗
candidate solution cˆx
∗
H
H
Figure 1: The candidate solution with no auditing.
Lemma 4 (i) For each initial condition (x0,H (0, x0)) with x0 ∈ (x, 1), the solution
cˆx0(·) to (18) exists and is unique in D. Further, it is strictly increasing and strictly
convex when x ≥ x0. C(L,H) = c(L) + cˆ
x0
(
H
L
)
is strictly convex when L < 0 and
H
L
≥ x0. The optimal policy uˆ
L in H ((cˆx0)′(x), x) implies dx
dt
> 0 (i.e., distortion
increases with the duration of low-income reports).
(ii) There is a unique initial condition, (x∗,H (0, x∗)), such that the solution cˆx
∗
(·)
does not exit D.
When x < x∗, the state takes a discrete jump to x∗. Hence we extend cˆx
∗
(·) to (0, x∗)
by cˆx
∗
(x) ≡ cˆx
∗
(x∗) for x < x∗. The candidate solution cˆx
∗
(·) satisfies the HJB equation
(16) in [x∗, 1) by definition. However, (16) is violated when x < x∗, because (cˆx
∗
)′(x) = 0
implies
cˆx
∗
(x) = cˆx
∗
(x∗) <
1
r + π
min
uˆL,µˆ
{
−
1
ρ
(
r + π − πx− ruˆL
)
+ rc
(
−uˆL
)
+ πc (−x)
}
.
This reinforces the intuition that the state variable x needs to exit (0, x∗) immediately.
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The candidate solution cˆx
∗
(·) implies an allocation. For each x ≥ x∗, the optimal
policy uˆL is determined as 1
1+ρ(x−b)(cˆx∗ )′(x)
, and the state variables evolve as in (12), (13)
and (15). In the next subsection, we verify that this implied allocation is optimal.
2.2.2 Verification
Given the initial promised utilities (L,H), the following lemma shows that
(i) The cost of the contract implied by cˆx
∗
(·) is C(L,H).
(ii) The costs of other I.C. contracts are weakly higher than C(L,H).
The main technique behind the proof is to integrate the HJB equation from time 0 to
time T and then take limit T →∞.
Lemma 5 When the auditing technology is not available, the contract implied by cˆx
∗
(·)
is optimal.
2.3 Discussion
We explain in this subsection why the distortion trends upwards. Our explanation
has two parts. First, we provide some intuition for why the distortion is an increasing
function of the ratio H/L. Second, we show that H/L increases with the duration of
low-income reports. Under persistent information the principal lets H fall faster than L
conditional on the low-income report, while in the i.i.d. case, they both fall at the same
rate.
2.3.1 Why does higher x imply higher distortion?
We have seen from Figure 1 that the distortion cˆx
∗
approaches infinity as x → 1.
This result might be puzzling, as the continuation utility H approaches L when x→ 1,
which is exactly the feature of the full-information contract. To resolve this puzzle, let
us compare the consumption paths when H approaches L, with and without private
information. With full information, consumption of a high-income agent approaches
that of a low-income agent whenever H approaches L, because the mapping between
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continuation utility and consumption is one-for-one. This one-for-one relationship no
longer holds with private information. The high-income agent’s consumption remains un-
distorted with private information. The low-income agent’s consumption path, however,
is very distorted when H is just slightly above L due to the incentive constraints. To
see this, note that limx→1(cˆ
x∗)′(x)→∞. When H is close to L, the low-income agent’s
flow utility uL = 1
1+ρ(x−b)(cˆx∗)′(x)
L is close to zero. The large consumption at that instant
needs to be offset by much lower levels of consumption in the future, so as to deliver
a given level of continuation utility L (to confirm this intuition, we show in Lemma
10 that both L(t) and H(t) decrease with time).6 The closer H is to L, the more a
low-income agent’s consumption is front-loaded and, hence, the faster his continuation
utility declines. Thus, higher x implies higher distortion.
2.3.2 Why does x increase with the duration of low-income reports?
To see the intuition for why H/L increases with the duration of low-income reports,
we start with a three-period model in which the agent has random income, either wH or
wL, in the first two periods. There is no discounting. In the last period, the agent has no
income, hence there is no need for income reports (and there are no incentive problems).
We keep the last period in the model so that the principal can provide incentives in the
second period when income is private. Income in the first period is private, and income
in the second period is public in Case 1 and private in Case 2. Here we focus on an
agent who has low income in the first period. The allocation for an agent who has high
income in the first period will not be discussed, as it is irrelevant.
Case 1: Income is private in the first period, but public in the second. Suppose
that income is i.i.d. The low-income agent’s continuation utility at the beginning of the
second period is
L(2) = πLVL + πHVH ,
where πi ≡ Pr(wi), Vi ≡ u(ci(2)) + u(ci(3)) is the utility conditional on the second pe-
6Here the low-income agent is savings constrained. In dynamic risk-sharing problems with private
information, optimal contracts typically restrict agents’ savings (Rogerson (1985), Green (1987)).
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riod’s income wi, i = L,H . Because income is i.i.d., the low-income agent’s continuation
utility, L(2), is also the liar’s continuation utility. It must be made lower than that for a
high-income agent, which is the dynamic reward versus punishment aspect of dynamic
contracts studied in Green (1987). Because income in the second period is observable,
the principal offers full insurance starting from the second period and chooses VH = VL.
When income is persistent, this equality fails as the informational content of observing
wH in the second period is different from observing wL: wH in the second period is more
suggestive of a liar than wL, hence, the principal will find it optimal to choose VH < VL.
This is akin to the moral-hazard (hidden-effort) model, where the agent’s consumption
is lower in states that are more likely to be realized with shirking. In the following we
offer an alternative interpretation related to the above information-content intuition,
but more useful for our purpose: in the persistent case, what matters for the incentive is
not only L(2), but also the difference between VH and VL. Because a liar is more likely
to receive VH (denote the liar’s probability of receiving wH in the second period as π˜H ,
π˜H > πH), his continuation utility is
L(2) + (π˜H − πH)(VH − VL).
The larger the difference between VH and VL, the more a liar could gain from the
continuation contract for the low-income agent. With persistence the principal has access
to a second instrument to reduce the liar’s gain: keep L(2) fixed but lower VH − VL.
This instrument is ineffective in the i.i.d. case, as the liar cares only about L(2). With
persistence, this instrument will always be used, as a small deviation from VH = VL has
a first-order effect on the incentive constraint but only incurs a second-order cost. In
fact, here the principal makes VH − VL negative.
Case 2: Income is private in both the first and the second periods. Different from
Case 1, here VH must be above VL, otherwise the agent will not reveal his second-period
income truthfully. However, the key insight from the previous case remains. With i.i.d.
incomes, only the continuation utility (the probability weighted average of VH and VL)
matters for the incentives; with persistent incomes, both the continuation utility and
the difference VH − VL matter. With i.i.d. incomes, the agent’s continuation utility falls
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with the first period’s low-income report; with persistent incomes, the average of VH and
VL still falls, but the principal lets VH fall faster than VL to further reduce a liar’s gain.
The intuition from the three-period model carries over to an infinite-horizon model.
Consider an infinite-horizon discrete-time model with i.i.d. income. Each period has a
length dt and the income is wH with probability πdt, and wL with probability 1 − πdt.
Green (1987) shows that this problem has only one state variable L(t), which is the
agent’s continuation utility before the realization of income in period t. Recall that
H(t) denotes the agent’s continuation utility after the realization of high income in
period t. The Bellman equation is
C(L(t)) = min
H(t),cL(t)
{
πdtC(H(t)) + (1− πdt)
[
rdtcL(t) + (1− rdt)C(L(t+ dt))
]}
s.t. H(t) ≥ (rdt)buL(t) + (1− rdt)L(t+ dt),
L(t) = πdtH(t) + (1− πdt)[(rdt)buL(t) + (1− rdt)L(t+ dt)],
where C(H(t)) is the cost following a high-income report. (We do not state the problem
following a high-income report explicitly because we want to focus on a path with only
low-income reports.) With CARA preferences, Green (1987) shows two properties of this
problem: (i) C(L(t)) and C(H(t)) differ from the full-information cost function only by
a constant; (ii) although continuation utility L(t) falls with the duration of low-income
reports (i.e., L(t) > L(t + dt)), the ratio x(t) = H(t)
L(t)
is constant. That x(t) remains
constant is because of the homogeneity property: policy functions (including current
and future utilities) in a continuation contract are all proportional to L(t). With i.i.d.
incomes, H(t) is a control variable and is optimized every period given L(t); in contrast,
in our model with persistent incomes, H(t) is also a state variable. The difference
H(t) − L(t) is the counterpart of the difference VH − VL in the above three-period
example. The Bellman equation when the high-income state is permanent is
C(L(t), H(t)) = min
cL(t)
{
πdtc(H(t)) + (1− πdt)
[
rdtcL(t) + (1− rdt)C(L(t+ dt), H(t+ dt))
]}
s.t. H(t) ≥ (rdt)buL(t) + (1− rdt)H(t+ dt),
L(t) = πdtH(t) + (1− πdt)[(rdt)buL(t) + (1− rdt)L(t + dt)].
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The two underlined terms reflect the differences from the i.i.d. case. The first difference is
immaterial because c(H(t)) andC(H(t)) differ only by a constant. The second difference
(i.e., H(t+dt) replaces L(t+dt) in the right side of the incentive constraint) accelerates
the speed at which H(t + dt) falls, because smaller H(t + dt) makes it easier to satisfy
the incentive constraint. Recall that H(t) is proportional to L(t) in the i.i.d. case. In
contrast, H(t) falls faster than L(t) in our model. As a result, x = H
L
increases with the
duration of low-income reports.
3 Model: Costly and Imperfect Auditing
When an auditing technology is available, the principal has access to two instruments.
Besides distorting the consumption path to provide incentives, now the principal can
deter cheating by auditing the agent’s report. Since high income is an absorbing state,
it is easy to see that auditing is unnecessary forever if the agent reports wH just once
in the past. Auditing costs γ units of consumption good. However, auditing is not
perfect: there is a positive probability ̟ > 0 of auditing error that labels a low-income
agent as having high income. If a low-income agent is audited after reporting wL, the
principal observes either a low-income signal L with probability 1−̟ or a high-income
signal H with probability ̟. On the other hand, there is no auditing error that labels
a high-income agent as having low income, i.e., if a high-income agent is audited after
reporting wL, the principal observes H with probability one.
The timing is as follows. In the initial period (t = 0), the agent receives an income,
either wH or wL. He chooses to report either wH or wL to the principal. Then conditional
on the low-income report, the principal chooses to audit according to a Poisson arrival
rate p(0). (Recall that auditing is unnecessary if the report is wH .) The principal assigns
current and future consumptions, conditional on the report, whether the audit occurs
and the signal L or H if the audit does occur. In subsequent periods, if an agent had
reported wH in the past, he is in an absorbing state and no further reports or auditing
are necessary. If an agent had reported wL in every period in the past, then he receives
an income, either wH or wL. The sequence of events then is the same as in the initial
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period.
Note that, since our model is in continuous time, p(t) is the endogenous arrival rate
of an audit at instant t, not the auditing probability itself. That is, over a period of
length dt, the principal audits with probability p(t)dt and does not audit with probability
1− p(t)dt. If p(t) = 0, no audit arrives, while if p(t) =∞, the auditing probability has
an atom at t.
Conditional on signals from the audit, the principal will assign new continuation
utilities to the agents. Let LL(t) and LH(t) be the continuation utilities of an audited
low-income agent with signals L and H at t, respectively. Let HH(t) be the continuation
utility of an audited high-income agent (whose signal can only be H) at t. Lastly, HL(t)
is the continuation utility of an audited low-income agent with signal L who transited
to high income immediately after he was audited.
The principal pre-commits not only to the two sequences of consumption, as in the
previous section, but also to the sequence of arrival rates of audit. We can again represent
the principal’s cost minimization problem recursively with L and H as state variables.
The cost must be weakly less than that in Section 2, since it is always feasible for the
principal to shut down auditing. We continue to exclude the discounted income from
the cost function C(L,H) for the same reason as in Section 2; however, C(L,H) now
includes both the cost of delivering consumption and the cost of auditing.
When the principal audits, (i) it is feasible for her to deliver any continuation utility
pair (L,H), such that L < 0 and H < 0; (ii) limH↓−∞C(L,H) <∞ (this contrasts with
limH↓L C(L,H) = ∞ in Section 2, and is explained below in Remark 3). These imply
that the full-information constant consumption can be achieved. To see this, suppose
that the principal wants to implement (L, L) and offers constant consumption c(L) to
the agent regardless of income reports. This is, however, not incentive compatible as
the high-income agent wants to underreport. To deter cheating, the principal randomly
jumps from state (L, L) to state (L,H) at a small rate ǫ > 0 conditional on the low-
income report. For any ǫ > 0, H can be made sufficiently low in order to restore the
incentive compatibility of the contract. Because each jump incurs a finite cost (because
C(L, ·) is bounded), the total cost incurred by the jumps diminishes when ǫ is made
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arbitrarily small.
Remark 3 It is easy to see that limH↓−∞C(L,H) <∞ when auditing is perfect. With
no auditing error, the principal could perfectly separate the two types of agents after
paying a finite cost γ. If the agent’s income is truly low, the principal could reset H to the
optimal level without affecting incentives, hence, C(L,H) ≤ γ+minH˜ C(L, H˜) for all H.
With auditing error, the principal could still partially separate the two types of agents by
auditing multiple times in a small time interval, say in [0, ǫ]. Consider a contract starting
at state (L,H) where H is low: cH(t) = c(H) and cL(t) = c(H)− (wH −wL), ∀t ≥ 0. In
this contract, the high-income agent is indifferent between reporting wH and wL. Hence,
this contract is incentive compatible and no auditing is needed for incentive purposes.
However, the low-income agent’s promise-keeping constraint is violated when H < L. To
solve this problem, the principal uses auditing to partially discover the low-income agent
and reward him. She audits at instants j
J
ǫ, j = 1, 2, ..., J , and stops when the signal
L arrives for the first time. Denote the first arrival time as τ (if L has not arrived
until ǫ, let τ = ∞). Since the principal observes only signal H from the high-income
agent and will observe signal L from the low-income agent sooner or later, this auditing
strategy discovers the low-income agent when J is large. For the principal to observe
a sequence of H signals of length J from the low-income agent, the agent either must
be extremely unlucky or must have transited to high income before ǫ. If ǫ is small, the
auditing cost is finite even when J is large.7 At τ , the principal resets L(τ) = L∗ to
satisfy the promise-keeping constraint. If ǫ is small and J is large, L∗ must be close to L
as the low-income agent’s probability of staying in the above contract is very small. The
principal also resets H(τ) to the optimal level, i.e., H(τ) ∈ argminH˜ C(L
∗, H˜), without
violating the incentive constraint, as a high-income agent cannot generate a signal L
and, hence, he does not benefit from the resetting. To summarize, the principal can
reduce the cost C(L,H) to minH˜ C(L
∗, H˜), by incurring a finite auditing cost in a small
time interval. Hence C(L,H) is bounded above no matter how low H is.
7The auditing cost is less than e−πǫ
∑J
j=1 γ̟
j−1 + (1 − e−πǫ)Jγ ≤ γ
1−̟
+ (1 − e−πǫ)Jγ, which
remains finite for large J because ǫ can be made arbitrarily small.
22
The previous discussion and Remark 3 imply that without further restrictions on
the domain of the cost function, the principal can deliver the full-information constant
consumption. To make the problem nontrivial, we exclude the region {(L,H) : H <
L < 0} from the domain of the cost function. If H < L < 0, the agent is induced not to
transit to the high-income state — he can secretly decline the wH offer and continue to
stay in the low-income state.
In the rest of this section, the domain of the cost function is restricted to {(L,H) :
L ≤ H < 0}. To see that the principal can deliver any (L,H) in the restricted domain,
recall from Section 2 that she can deliver L < H < 0, even when the auditing technology
is not available. Auditing helps the principal deliver L = H < 0, as shown in Remark
4 below.
For now we impose a restriction that atomic auditing is not allowed. In subsection
3.2, we verify that the principal will not use atomic auditing even if it is allowed. When
there is no atomic auditing (i.e., p(·) < ∞), the probability that auditing does not
occur in [t, s) conditional on the history up to time t is e−
∫ s
t
p(ξ)dξ. The promise-keeping
constraint is
L(t) =
∫ s
t
e−(r+π)(ξ−t)−
∫ ξ
t
p(η)dη
(
ruL(ξ) + πH(ξ) + p(ξ) ((1−̟)LL(ξ) +̟LH(ξ))
)
dξ
+e−(r+π)(s−t)−
∫ s
t
p(ξ)dξL(s), for all t < s. (19)
The incentive constraint is
H(t) ≥
∫ s
t
e−r(ξ−t)−
∫ ξ
t
p(η)dη
(
rbuL(ξ) + p(ξ)HH(ξ)
)
dξ
+e−r(s−t)−
∫ s
t
p(ξ)dξH(s), for all t < s. (20)
Using the same arguments as in Lemma 1, we know that the promise-keeping con-
straint (19) and the incentive constraint (20) hold for all t < s if and only if
L(s)− L(t) =
∫ s
t
(
(r + π + p(ξ))L(ξ)− ruL(ξ)− πH(ξ)
−p(ξ) ((1−̟)LL(ξ) +̟LH(ξ))
)
dξ, (21)
H(s)−H(t) ≤
∫ s
t
(
(r + p(ξ))H(ξ)− rbuL(ξ)− p(ξ)HH(ξ)
)
dξ, for all t < s.(22)
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Note that the above integral equations are generalized versions of (5) and (6) in Section
2. If the auditing technology is not available (i.e., p(·) = 0), then (21) and (22) are
identical to (5) and (6).
Remark 4 In the domain of the cost function, the utility pair L = H < 0 can be
delivered by the following contract,
L(·) = H(·) = LH(·) = HH(·) = L = H, HL(·) ≥ LL(·) =
L
2
,
cH(·) = c(H), cL(·) = c(L)− (wH − wL), p(·) =
2r(|u(wL − wH)| − 1)
1−̟
.
This contract satisfies (21) and (22).
In the following, we use the same heuristic arguments as in Section 2 to obtain a
HJB equation. Similar to (15), the differential equation for x is
dx
dt
= r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x+ p
(
HˆH − (1−̟)xLˆL −̟xLˆH
)
+ µˆ,
where
uˆL ≡
uL
L
, LˆL ≡ −
LL
L
, HˆL ≡ −
HL
L
, LˆH ≡ −
LH
L
, HˆH ≡ −
HH
L
,
and µˆ ≥ 0 is, again, a slack variable. Similar to (16), the HJB equation satisfied by cˆ(·)
is
(r + π)cˆ(x)
= min
uˆL,p,LˆL,LˆH,HˆL,HˆH,µˆ
{
−
1
ρ
(
r + π − πx− ruˆL + p
(
(1−̟)LˆL +̟LˆH + 1
))
+cˆ′(x)
(
r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x+ p
(
HˆH − (1−̟)xLˆL −̟xLˆH
)
+ µˆ
)
+rc
(
−uˆL
)
+ πc (−x) + p
(
(1−̟)C(LˆL, HˆL) +̟C(LˆH, HˆH) + γ − cˆ(x)
)}
.
Collecting all the terms with p, the above HJB equation can be written as
cˆ(x) =
1
r + π
min
uˆL,µˆ
{
−
1
ρ
(
r + π − πx− ruˆL
)
+ cˆ′(x)
(
r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x+ µˆ
)
+rc
(
−uˆL
)
+ πc (−x)
}
+
1
r + π
min
p≥0
p (γ −M (cˆ′(x), x)) ,
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where
M (d, x) ≡ max
LˆL,LˆH,HˆL,HˆH
{
1
ρ
(
(1−̟)LˆL +̟LˆH + 1
)
+ d
(
(1−̟)xLˆL +̟xLˆH
−HˆH
)
+
(
cˆ(x)− (1−̟)C(LˆL, HˆL)−̟C(LˆH, HˆH)
)}
measures the benefit of an audit. Note that the benefit and hence, the decision whether
to audit, do not depend on H and L separately, but depend only on the ratio x. Auditing
yields two benefits: cˆ(x) − (1 − ̟)C(LˆL, HˆL) − ̟C(LˆH, HˆH) is the benefit due to the
jumps to new states that potentially have lower cost, while d
(
(1−̟)xLˆL+̟xLˆH−HˆH
)
+
1
ρ
(
(1−̟)LˆL+̟LˆH+1
)
measures the benefit from relaxing the incentive constraint and
the promise-keeping constraint through auditing (because auditing changes the evolution
of both x(t) and L(t)).
The HJB equation requires that
M (cˆ′(x), x) ≤ γ,
with p = 0 whenever the inequality is strict. Hence minp≥0 p (γ −M (cˆ
′(x), x)) = 0, and
auditing does not contribute to the right side of the HJB equation. Therefore,
cˆ(x) =
1
r + π
min
uˆL,µˆ
{
−
1
ρ
(
r + π − πx− ruˆL
)
+ cˆ′(x)
(
r(x− b)uˆL
+π(x− 1)x+ µˆ
)
+ rc
(
−uˆL
)
+ πc (−x)
}
, (23)
which is identical to (16), except here cˆ(·) is defined also at the boundary x = 1.
In subsection 3.1, we solve for the optimal contract. In the solution, the principal au-
dits if and only if x = 1 and the optimal auditing is periodic. In subsection 3.2, we show
that the principal would not use atomic auditing. In subsection 3.3, we study implica-
tions of the optimal contract. Finally, in subsection 3.4, we discuss various extensions
of the model.
3.1 The Optimal Contract with Auditing
3.1.1 Candidate Solution
Recall that the candidate solution in Section 2 starts with the initial condition
(x∗,H (0, x∗)). The principal’s cost when the auditing technology is available must
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be less than that in Section 2. Hence in solving the ODE (18), we focus on solutions
that start with x0 > x
∗ and hit the boundary x = 1.
The auditing arrival rate p is positive when x = 1. To see this, suppose p = 0 when
x = 1. Then
dx
dt
|x=1 = r(1− b)uˆ
L + µˆ > 0,
which violates the domain restriction x ≤ 1 (i.e., L ≤ H). Therefore, p (γ −M (cˆ′(x), x)) =
0 implies
M (cˆ′(x), x)|x=1 = γ.
With this condition, there is a unique solution to (18). We will verify the optimality of
the candidate solution in subsection 3.1.2.
Lemma 6 There is a unique initial condition x∗∗ such that the solution cˆx
∗∗
(·) to (18)
satisfies M ((cˆx
∗∗
)′(1), 1) = γ (see Figure 2).
Next we show that the benefit of auditing is monotonic in x.
Lemma 7 M ((cˆx
∗∗
)′(x), x) increases in x. Therefore, if x < 1, then
M ((cˆx
∗∗
)′(x), x) < γ.
The intuition for the monotonicity of the benefit function can be seen in a simple case.
Suppose that auditing is perfect and the principal pre-commits to auditing at time t with
probability one. Then the high-income agent cannot underreport at t, and the principal
can jump from state (L,H) to (L, Lx∗∗) without violating any incentive constraint. Here
the benefit of auditing is C(L,H) − C(L, Lx∗∗) = cˆx
∗∗
(x) − cˆx
∗∗
(x∗∗), which increases
in x. In other words, the benefit here is to reset H and remove the distortion in the
consumption allocation. The larger the distortion is, the larger the benefit of auditing
would be. In the general case of stochastic auditing with errors, the benefit of auditing
would be similar, although M takes a more complicated form.
Let N be the moment when the trajectory of x(t) implied by the candidate solution
reaches the boundary 1 starting from x(0) = x∗∗. In the pre-commitment contract, the
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principal guarantees that she would not audit until N , despite the fact that income
is private information. When the duration of the agent’s low-income reports reaches
N , he will be audited randomly according to an endogenous arrival rate p > 0. The
actual instant of audit depends on the realization of the audit random variable, so the
actual audit could be realized at any t ≥ N . Two remarks regarding N are in order:
(i) while auditing is stochastic, the threshold duration N is deterministic; (ii) while N
depends on primitives of the model, it does not depend on the initial promised utility L0.
The homogeneity property implies that, if {(L(t), H(t)); t ≥ 0} is the optimal trajectory
when the initial promise is L0, then
{(
L¯0
L0
L(t), L¯0
L0
H(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the optimal trajectory
when the initial promise is L¯0 6= L0. The two paths reach x = 1 at the same time.
Our main result is that the auditing pattern is periodic. The optimal mechanism
consists of cycles. A low-income agent begins each cycle with the continuation utilities
(L,H), such that H/L = x∗∗, and is initially not audited. The pair (L(·), H(·)) falls with
the duration of low-income reports until N (i.e., until x = 1). After N , the principal
randomly audits and (L(·), H(·)) remains unchanged until audit arrives. When the audit
arrives and the observed signal is H, the agent is punished by a downward jump in his
continuation utilities. The new state still satisfies x = 1 and, hence, the agent continues
to be audited randomly. A new cycle starts the moment after the observed signal from
the audit is L. In the new cycle, the low-income agent begins with improved continuation
utilities (LL, HL), such that HL/LL = x
∗∗.
Proposition 1 Given the initial utility L0, the principal chooses H0 such that H0/L0 =
x∗∗. Starting from x∗∗, the solution to ODE (18) reaches x = 1 in finite time N . After
N and conditional on low-income report, the principal audits with an arrival rate p > 0.
The utility pair (L(t), H(t)) remains stationary: L(t) = H(t) = L(N) = H(N), ∀t ≥ N ,
until the agent is randomly drawn to be audited. If the observed signal from the audit is
H, the agent is punished, LH = HH < L(N). If the signal is L, the agent is rewarded,
LL > L(N). The new state satisfies HL/LL = x
∗∗ and, hence, the contract enters a new
cycle.
There are two instruments to provide incentives for truthfully reporting the transition
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(d¯(x), x)
(0, x)
c
b 1
D
x x∗ candidate solution cˆx
∗∗
state resets if L is
observed after auditing
x∗∗
H
H
Figure 2: The candidate solution with auditing.
to high income. The first instrument is dynamic taxation that distorts the consumption
path and the second instrument is auditing. Proposition 1 shows that the principal
uses the first instrument only when L < H and the second only when L = H . Recall
that cˆ(x) measures the distortion in the continuation contract (see the discussion after
Lemma 2), and the closer x is to 1, the higher is the distortion. The principal switches
to the auditing instrument only when the distortion is the highest, i.e., when L = H .
The principal alternates between dynamic taxation and auditing because the net
benefit of the first instrument is decreasing with the distortion, while that of the second
is increasing with the distortion. Starting with the full-insurance consumption path, a
first-order distortion in consumption generates only a second-order cost to the principal.
Thus, when consumption distortion is small, it is nearly costless to use the first instru-
ment and the principal will avoid the second instrument of auditing, which has a cost
γ. When L equals H , the consumption distortion is high, so further distortion using
the dynamic taxation instrument is costly. At this stage, the principal abandons the
first instrument and switches to the second. Conditional on discovering the truth-teller
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after an audit, she removes the previously accumulated distortion by resetting the state
variables. After the resetting, a new cycle begins and the principal switches back to the
first instrument.
Periodic auditing is the outcome of joint optimization of the two instruments. If
distortion does not grow as it does here, then the periodic auditing may no longer be
optimal. In particular, in models with i.i.d. income, such as Green (1987), the distortion
is constant as noted in subsection 2.1. Wang (2005) shows that the optimal auditing
probability in such environments is time invariant. In a private information model with
two-state Markov chain shocks, Nakamura (2009) derives a debt contract that follows a
cycle. In the “normal” phase of the cycle, the borrower pays a fixed amount to the lender,
and in the “restructuring” phase of the cycle, the borrower declares bankruptcy and his
payments are reduced. Unlike our model, the income is not reported in Nakamura’s
model and the contract is not designed to elicit truthful revelation of income. His result
is due to the evolution of the lender’s beliefs regarding the borrower’s income, not due
to the accumulation of distortions.
Our periodic auditing result holds no matter how high the auditing cost γ is. This
is because the distortion in consumption converges to infinity (see Section 2) and the
benefit of using the auditing instrument will eventually surpass any finite cost. This
result contrasts with those in Wang (2005) and Monnet and Quintin (2005), where the
benefit of audit remains bounded and the principal does not audit when γ is large.
3.1.2 Verification
Similar to subsection 2.2.2, we verify that the allocation implied by the candidate
solution cˆx
∗∗
(·) is indeed optimal.
Lemma 8 When the auditing technology is available, the contract implied by cˆx
∗∗
(·) is
optimal.
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3.2 No Atomic Auditing
In the previous subsection, we have shown that the principal would set p = 0 when
L < H and would set p > 0 but finite when L = H . In this subsection we will show
that the principal would never set p = ∞, i.e., she will never use atomic auditing. To
see this, suppose that the auditing probability has an atom of size P > 0 with the state
(L,H). With probability P the principal audits and with probability 1 − P she does
not. Thus, the cost minimization problem for the principal is
M(P ) = min
LL,HL,LH,HH,L¯,H¯
P ((1−̟)C(LL, HL) +̟C(LH, HH) + γ)
+(1− P )C
(
L¯, H¯
)
(24)
s.t. L = P ((1−̟)LL +̟LH) + (1− P )L¯, (25)
H ≥ PHH + (1− P )H¯, (26)
where (LL, HL) denotes the state if the observed signal from the audit is L, (LH, HH)
denotes the state if the signal is H and (L¯, H¯) denotes the state if the agent is not
audited. Note that M(0) = C(L,H). Lemma 9 below states that atomic auditing is
not optimal.
Lemma 9 At any (L,H), L ≤ H, there is no atomic auditing, because M(P ) > M(0)
for all P > 0.
3.3 Implications of the Optimal Contract
1. Reducing the cost of auditing (smaller γ) increases the auditing frequency.
A smaller γ makes the auditing instrument cheaper. As a result, the principal is willing
to audit more frequently. For all γ, the auditing instrument is used only when x = 1.
However, x∗∗ (see Figure 2) increases with smaller γ. Hence, N , the time taken to reach
x = 1 from x = x∗∗, is less for smaller γ.
2. Increasing the variance of income (larger wH − wL) increases the auditing fre-
quency.
With a larger wH − wL, there is a larger benefit to the agent from underreporting
income. In the absence of an auditing technology, the low-income agent’s consumption
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path needs to be distorted more to provide dynamic incentives for truth telling. The
benefit of auditing is increased with a larger wH−wL, as a result, the auditing instrument
is used more frequently.
3. Agents with an intermediate level of risk aversion are audited more frequently
relative to agents with either low or high risk aversion.
When the absolute risk aversion ρ is small, the variation in the consumption path implies
little cost to the principal, thus there is no need to use auditing to reduce the distortion.
When ρ is large, a small variation in consumption is able to generate large incentive
effects. Again, there is no need to audit. More specifically, let L0 = −1 and consider a
contract in which auditing is not used and consumptions decline linearly, i.e., cH(t) =
cL(t) =
log( pir+pi)−rt
ρ
. This contract delivers the promised utility L0 because∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πH(t) + ruL(t)
)
dt = −
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
(π + r)ert
π
r + π
)
dt = −1.
It is I.C. because
dH(t)
dt
= rH(t) < rH(t)− rbuL(t).
When ρ→∞, the cost of the contract converges to the full-information cost c(L0). The
above no-auditing contract has very little distortion in consumption, and there is no
need to correct it frequently by auditing.
3.4 Discussion
Show-me assumption. We have assumed that the principal always asks the agent
to show his income. This assumption prevents low-income agents from reporting high
income, hence we do not have to include the incentive constraint for the low-income
agent. In fact, even if we include this incentive constraint, it never binds. To see this,
recall that x(t) always stays above x, where x is the unique root to r(x−b)+π(x−1)x = 0
in (b, 1) (see Lemma 3). Therefore, the incentive constraint for the low-income agent∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
rb−1H(t) + πH(t)
)
=
rb−1 + π
r + π
H(t) < L(t)
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is always satisfied, because
rb−1 + π
r + π
x(t)− 1 >
rb−1 + π
r + π
x− 1 =
r
r + π
(
xb−1 − 1
)
> 0.
Auditing error. If auditing is perfect (̟ = 0), then an arbitrarily small arrival rate
of audit plus infinite penalty would deliver the full-information constant consumption.
Our assumption ̟ > 0 implies that when H is observed, the principal cannot be 100
percent certain that the agent is a liar and, hence, would not want to impose an infinite
penalty.
Finite punishment. When punishment is exogenous and finite, the full-information
constant consumption cannot be achieved even with perfect auditing.
In Ravikumar and Zhang (2010), after an audit, a liar is caught with probability
one and his consumption is reduced forever by an exogenous amount. We show that the
optimal mechanism is still periodic auditing.
Popov (2007) imposes an exogenous lower bound on the agent’s continuation utility
in an i.i.d. income model with no auditing errors. He shows that both the distortion
and the auditing probability depend on the level of the agent’s continuation utility.
This contrasts with our model, where the auditing probability is independent of the
low-income agent’s continuation utility. In his model, after an audit the liar is pushed
to the lower bound on continuation utility. Thus, in the event of being caught after the
audit, agents with high continuation utility suffer a more severe punishment relative to
agents with low continuation utility. For agents with high continuation utility, a low
auditing probability combined with a severe punishment is very effective. For agents
with continuation utility at the lower bound, the auditing instrument is not effective
because the principal cannot punish a liar any more.8 In our model, there is no lower
bound on continuation utility and the auditing instrument is always effective.
The benefit of auditing in our model is to remove the distortion embedded in the
dynamic contract. This notion of auditing benefit applies more generally. Consider a
model where the agent’s private information θ ∈ {θ1, θ2, ..., θn}, evolves as a Markov
8At low continuation utility in Popov’s environment, both the dynamic taxation and the auditing
instruments are weak, so the determination of auditing probability is nontrivial.
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chain. The private information θ could represent the agent’s income, his taste shocks,
or other risks that are relevant to allocating resources to the agent efficiently. The
principal’s problem is to deliver an initial level of utility to the agent at a minimal
cost, subject to incentive constraints. This problem can be formulated recursively by
keeping track of the shock θ and a vector of continuation utilities v ∈ Rn; the vector v
contains the continuation utility, vθ, for the agent whose current type is θ and (n − 1)
continuation utilities, v−θ, for agents who just transited to other states. Let C(v, θ)
denote the principal’s discounted expected cost of delivering the vector v. Suppose that
auditing is perfect and non-stochastic and that the punishment is exogenous and finite
(the punishment could be a function of the vector v and the liar’s true type, observed
after auditing). If no cheating is found upon auditing, the principal can re-optimize all
continuation utilities v−θ and obtain a benefit C(vθ, v−θ, θ)−minv˜−θ C(vθ, v˜−θ, θ). In such
a general environment, it is optimal for the principal to wait for some positive amount of
time after an audit before she audits again. This is because v−θ is reset to the minimizer
immediately after the audit. Continuity implies that v−θ remains close to the minimizer
for some interval of time. Since auditing has a fixed cost, there is a region around the
minimizer where the cost of auditing dominates the benefit. Thus, the optimal contract
implies that the principal commits to no auditing for a length of time and eliminates
the distortion by resetting the state variable after every audit. The duration between
two audits may not be a constant and may depend on how the distortion evolves in the
optimal contract.
Preferences. With CARA utility, the distortion in our optimal contract is indepen-
dent of the agent’s continuation utility. Instead the distortion depends only on the ratio
of the high-income agent’s utility H to the low-income agent’s utility L. For general
utilities, the distortion depends on both the level and the ratio. The principal’s cost
function becomes two dimensional, making it difficult to obtain a full characterization
of the optimal contract.
In a model with CRRA preferences, we find that the auditing probability is small
when the agent’s continuation utility is either extremely high or extremely low (see
Lemma 13 in the Appendix). This is consistent with the finding in subsection 3.3 that
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the auditing probability is small when the absolute risk aversion is extremely large or
extremely small (the absolute risk aversion in CRRA preferences decreases with con-
sumption and with the agent’s level of continuation utility).
Absorbing state. Our assumption that the high-income state is permanent allows
us to focus on the path with only low-income reports. If the transition rate from high
income to low income, π′, is positive, the analysis becomes more complex. Not only does
the principal’s problem after the transition to high income become nontrivial, but the
dynamics before the transition to wH are also altered. For π
′ > 0, the candidate solution
to (18) is not easy to find analytically, because the solution curve may reach the upper
bound H (d¯(·), ·), and local Lipschitz condition fails there. Our numerical result shows
that without auditing and when π′ is small, the ratio x = H
L
approaches one (i.e., the
distortion approaches infinity). Thus, our periodic auditing result in Section 3 still holds
when π′ is small. When π′ is much larger than π, x still increases with the duration of
low-income reports, but it approaches a limit strictly below one. That is, the distortion
in the contract remains bounded. Hence, it is no longer true that auditing will be used
eventually regardless of the auditing cost γ. To summarize, our periodic auditing result
requires high persistence of the high-income state, but the high-income state need not
be absorbing.
Multiple income levels. Our assumption that income is either wH or wL is restrictive.
One implication of this assumption is that auditing occurs only at the lowest income
level (i.e., wL). When there are more than two income levels, the principal might audit
any income level below the maximum. If we assume that the only binding incentive
constraint when the report is wi is for the agent at the next higher income level wi+1,
then our measure of distortion remains useful.9 The distortion in this case is the ratio
of the continuation utility for the agent who just transited to wi+1 to that for the agent
who remains at wi. It would be interesting to examine how the distortion evolves and
whether the optimal auditing is still periodic with multiple income levels.
9Kapicka (2010) and Williams (2011) make this assumption in their private-information models. A
general condition on primitives for this assumption to be valid is still unknown.
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4 Conclusion
We have studied insurance and auditing in a repeated hidden income environment
with persistent incomes. A principal, with imperfect ability to audit, designs an optimal
taxation scheme as well as an optimal auditing scheme. When the agent’s absolute risk
aversion is constant, we have shown that it is optimal to audit the low-income agent
periodically. The optimal mechanism consists of cycles. Within each cycle, an agent
reporting low income is guaranteed that he will not be audited until the duration of low-
income reports exceeds a threshold. After the threshold is reached, the agent is audited
randomly. After the random audit, if the agent is discovered to be a truth-teller, then a
new cycle begins.
The low-income agent’s consumption path is intertemporally distorted. We measure
the distortion as the principal’s cost minus the cost of the full-information constant
consumption that delivers the same utility to the low-income agent. Unlike the repeated
hidden income model with i.i.d. incomes, the distortion in our model increases with the
duration of low-income reports. Auditing helps the principal detect who is the truth-
teller and who is the cheater. She can thus correct the distortion in the consumption
path after an audit. The benefit of auditing increases with the duration of low-income
reports whereas the cost of auditing is constant. Consequently, the principal would use
the auditing instrument no matter how high the auditing cost is.
Since auditing is imperfect in our model, the principal cannot detect a liar with cer-
tainty and, hence, would not want to impose an infinite penalty. If auditing were perfect,
then the optimal mechanism is a small probability of audit plus infinite penalty. This
mechanism delivers the full-insurance consumption.10 However, with perfect auditing
but exogenous and finite penalty, the optimal mechanism is periodic auditing.
10When both the auditing probability and the penalty are exogenously specified, Armenter and
Mertens (2010) show that full-insurance consumption can be achieved in the long run in a dynamic
Mirrlees taxation model.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: We only show the equivalence between (3) and (6), since the
equivalence between (2) and (5) can be obtained similarly by replacing the inequalities
below with equalities.
Necessity: If (3) holds for all t < s, then
H(t) +
∫ s
t
(
rH(ξ)− rbuL(ξ)
)
dξ
≥
∫ s
t
e−r(ξ−t)rbuL(ξ)dξ + e−r(s−t)H(s)
+
∫ s
t
(
r
(∫ s
ξ
e−r(η−ξ)rbuL(η)dη + e−r(s−ξ)H(s)
)
− rbuL(ξ)
)
dξ
=
(
e−r(s−t) +
∫ s
t
re−r(s−ξ)dξ
)
H(s) +
∫ s
t
(
e−r(ξ−t) − 1
)
rbuL(ξ)dξ
+
∫ s
t
r
(∫ s
ξ
e−r(η−ξ)rbuL(η)dη
)
dξ
= H(s) +
∫ s
t
(
e−r(ξ−t) − 1
)
rbuL(ξ)dξ +
∫ s
t
(∫ η
t
re−r(η−ξ)dξ
)
rbuL(η)dη
= H(s) +
∫ s
t
(
e−r(ξ−t) − 1
)
rbuL(ξ)dξ +
∫ s
t
(
1− e−r(η−t)
)
rbuL(η)dη
= H(s).
Hence, inequality (6) is verified.
Sufficiency: Define an absolutely continuous function f(·) as
f(s) ≡
∫ s
t
e−r(ξ−t)rbuL(ξ)dξ + e−r(s−t)
(
H(t) +
∫ s
t
(
rH(ξ)− rbuL(ξ)
)
dξ
)
.
Because f is absolutely continuous, it is differentiable almost everywhere (a.e.), and
f ′(s) = e−r(s−t)rbuL(s)− re−r(s−t)
(
H(t) +
∫ s
t
(
rH(ξ)− rbuL(ξ)
)
dξ
)
+e−r(s−t)
(
rH(s)− rbuL(s)
)
= re−r(s−t)
(
H(s)−H(t)−
∫ s
t
(
rH(ξ)− rbuL(ξ)
)
dξ
)
, a.e.
If (6) holds, then f ′(s) ≤ 0 a.e. Then, it follows from Theorem 29.15 in Aliprantis and
Burkinshaw (1990) that
f(s) = f(t) +
∫ s
t
f ′(ξ)dξ ≤ f(t) = H(t).
Therefore, ∫ s
t
e−r(ξ−t)rbuL(ξ)dξ + e−r(s−t)H(s) ≤ f(s) ≤ H(t),
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which verifies inequality (3). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
(i) Equation (7) holds because
{(
cL∗(t), cH∗(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the optimal contract to
implement (L,H) if and only if
{(
cL∗(t)− log(α)
ρ
, cH∗(t)− log(α)
ρ
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is the
optimal contract to implement (αL, αH).
(ii) We show that C(L, H¯) ≤ C(L,H) for any H < H¯ . Pick any I.C. contract{(
cL(t), cH(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
that implements (L,H). If we simply redefine cH(0) to be
c(H¯) and leave other consumptions unchanged, the contract implements (L, H¯).
That is, the modified contract starting with (L, H¯) coincides with the original con-
tract immediately after time zero. Hence, the two contracts have the same cost.
The modified contract is incentive compatible too, because incentive constraints
allow for downward jumps in H(·). Therefore, C(L, H¯) ≤ C(L,H).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i) When cˆ′(x) = 0, the optimal uˆL is 1, and, hence, H (0, x) = π
r+π
(
−1
ρ
(1− x) + c(−x)
)
decreases in x.
(ii) The Envelope theorem implies that (r+ π)∂H (d,x)
∂d
= r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x = dx
dt
.
When x ≤ b, it follows from uˆL > 0 and r(x− b)uˆL+π(x− 1)x ≤ 0 that d¯(x) = 0.
When x > b, the first-order condition implies that the optimal policy uˆL(d) is
1
1+dρ(x−b)
and decreases in d. Hence
(r + π)
∂H (d, x)
∂d
=
r(x− b)
1 + dρ(x− b)
+ π(x− 1)x,
which decreases in d because x > b. Thus H (·, x) is concave in d and to find d¯(x),
it suffices to study the first-order condition. When d = 0,
(r + π)
∂H (d, x)
∂d
|d=0 = r(x− b) + π(x− 1)x
{
≤ 0, if b < x ≤ x,
> 0, if x < x < 1.
Recall that x is the unique root to r(x− b) + π(x− 1)x = 0 in (b, 1). From these
first-order conditions, we know that the optimal d¯(x) is 0 when b ≤ x ≤ x. When
x < x < 1, the first-order condition (r + π)∂H (d,x)
∂d
= r(x−b)
1+dρ(x−b)
+ π(x − 1)x = 0
yields
d¯(x) =
1
ρ
(
r
πx(1− x)
−
1
x− b
)
> 0.
(iii) Part (ii) states that if x > x, then ∂H (d,x)
∂d
= 0 when d = d¯(x), and ∂H (d,x)
∂d
> 0
when 0 ≤ d < d¯(x).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
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(i) Because d∗(x, cˆ) in (18) is continuously differentiable in the open set D, it satisfies
the local Lipschitz condition at every point (x, cˆ). Hence, the solution to (18) exists
and is unique in a neighborhood of every point.11 Then a global solution can be
obtained by pasting the local solutions until the solution reaches boundaries of D.
To simplify notation, we omit the superscript x0 from cˆ
x0(·) in the following. To
show that cˆ(·) is strictly convex, it suffices to show that cˆ′′ > ρ(cˆ′)2 ≥ 0. Differen-
tiating cˆ = H (cˆ′, x) with respect to x yields
(r + π)cˆ′ = (r + π) (Hx + Hdcˆ
′′)
=
(
π
ρ
+ cˆ′(ruˆL + π(2x− 1))−
π
ρx
)
+ (r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x)cˆ′′
< cˆ′(ruˆL + π) + (r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x)cˆ′′,
where the inequality follows from x < 1 and cˆ′ > 0. Then it follows from uˆL =
1
1+ρ(x−b)cˆ′
that
cˆ′′(x) >
rcˆ′ − rcˆ′uˆL
r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x
>
rcˆ′ − rcˆ′uˆL
r(x− b)uˆL
= ρ(cˆ′)2.
To see the strict convexity of C(L,H) = c(L) + cˆ(H
L
), note that
CLL = ρ
−1L−2 + 2cˆ′HL−3 + cˆ′′H2L−4 > 0,
CHH = cˆ
′′L−2 > 0,
CHL = −cˆ
′L−2 − cˆ′′HL−3.
Therefore,
CLLCHH − C
2
HL = ρ
−1L−2cˆ′′L−2 −
(
−cˆ′L−2
)2
> 0.
To see that distortion increases with the duration of low-income reports, recall from
the proof of part (ii) in Lemma 3 that dx
dt
= (r+π)∂H (d,x)
∂d
> 0 when (x, cˆ(x)) ∈ D.
(ii) First, we show that solutions are ordered. If x0 and y0 are two initial conditions
such that x0 < y0, then cˆ
x0(x) > cˆy0(x) whenever both cˆx0(·) and cˆy0(·) are defined
at x. Initially when x = y0, since cˆ
x0(·) is increasing, cˆx0(y0) > cˆ
x0(x0) > cˆ
y0(y0).
When x > y0, because d
∗(x, c) increases in c, we get d∗(x, cˆx0(x)) > d∗(x, cˆy0(x)).
That is, curve cˆx0(·) rises faster than cˆy0(·). Consequently cˆx0(·) is always above
cˆy0(·).
Second, we show the existence of an initial condition x∗ such that the solution
cˆx
∗
(·) does not exit D. Let A be the collection of initial conditions such that the
solution exits D for the first time at x = 1,
A ≡
{
x0 ∈ (x, 1) : cˆ
x0(x) < H (d¯(x), x), ∀x ∈ [x0, 1), and cˆ
x0(1) ∈ R
}
.
11Although the local Lipschitz condition fails on the upper boundary H (d¯(·), ·) of D, our proof does
not require it.
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A is clearly non-empty since x0 ∈ A when x0 is sufficiently close to 1; on the other
hand, A does not contain all points in (x, 1) because the solution cˆx0(·) will reach
the upper boundary when x0 is sufficiently close to x. Define x
∗ ≡ inf A > x.
We now show that the solution cˆx
∗
(·) does not exit D. Clearly, cˆx
∗
(·) could not
reach x = 1 because it is above all solutions that reach x = 1. To prove that
cˆx
∗
(·) could not reach the upper boundary H (d¯(·), ·), by contradiction, suppose
cˆx
∗
(x) = H (d¯(x), x) for some x ∈ (x, 1). Then upper boundary is flatter than
cˆx
∗
(·) at x, because
dH (d¯(x), x)
dx
=
∂H (d¯(x), x)
∂x
=
1
r + π
(
π
ρ
+ d¯(x)
(
ruˆL + π(2x− 1)
)
−
π
ρx
)
<
1
r + π
d¯(x)
(
ruˆL + π(2x− 1)
)
= d¯(x) =
(
cˆx
∗)′
(x),
since x < 1 and uˆL < 1. By continuity, the solution cˆx
∗+ǫ(·) must cross the upper
boundary when ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small. This contradicts the fact that x∗ is the
infimum of A (i.e., cˆx
∗+ǫ(·) must be below the upper boundary for all ǫ > 0).
Third, we show the uniqueness of x∗. By contradiction, suppose that both cˆx0(·)
and cˆy0(·) stay in D forever for some x0 < y0. Denote x1(c) and y1(c) as the
inverse of cˆx0(·) and cˆy0(·), respectively. That is cˆx0(x1(c)) = cˆ
y0(y1(c)) = c. Since
limx→1 H (d¯(x), x) = limx→1 cˆ
x0(x) = limx→1 cˆ
y0(x) =∞, we get that
lim
c→∞
(y1(c)− x1(c)) = 0.
On the other hand, when x is close to 1 and d¯(x) is large, (r+π)Hx =
π
ρ
+d¯(x)(ruˆL+
π(2x−1))− π
ρx
> 0, hence d∗(x, c) decreases in x, as ∂d
∗(x,c)
∂x
= −Hx
Hd
< 0. Therefore,
y′1(c)− x
′
1(c) =
1
(cˆy0)′(y1)
−
1
(cˆx0)′(x1)
=
1
d∗(y1, c)
−
1
d∗(x1, c)
> 0,
which is a contradiction to the above.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: To see that the cost of the constructed contract is C(L,H),
define
f(T ) ≡
∫ T
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H(t)) + rcL(t)
)
dt+ e−(r+π)TC (L(T ), H(T )) ,
which is differentiable because the trajectories L(·), H(·) implied by cˆ(·) are differentiable
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in T .12 It follows from the HJB equation (14) that
f ′(T ) = e−(r+π)T
(
πc(H(T )) + rcL(T )− CL
dL(T )
dT
− CH
dH(T )
dT
)
−e−(r+π)T (r + π)C (L(T ), H(T ))
= 0.
Hence f(·) is a constant. In particular, for all T > 0,
C (L,H) = f(0) =
∫ T
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H(t)) + rcL(t)
)
dt+ e−(r+π)TC (L(T ), H(T )) .
Lemma 11 in the Appendix shows that the tail in the above converges to zero when
T →∞, thus taking limit T →∞ yields
C (L,H) =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H(t)) + rcL(t)
)
dt.
To see that the cost of an I.C. contract
{
(c˜H(t), c˜L(t)); t ≥ 0
}
is higher than C(L,H),
define
f(T ) ≡
∫ T
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H˜(t)) + rc˜L(t)
)
dt+ e−(r+π)TX(T ),
where
X(T ) ≡ C(L(0), H(0)) +
∫ T
0
CL(L˜(t), H˜(t))
(
(r + π)L˜(t)− πH˜(t)− ru˜L(t)
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
CH(L˜(t), H˜(t))
(
rH˜(t)− rbu˜L(t)
)
dt.
We claim that
X(t) ≤ C(L˜(t), H˜(t)), for all t ≥ 0. (27)
If H˜(·) is differentiable, this is easy to show as X(0) = C(L(0), H(0)) and
X ′(t) = CL(L˜(t), H˜(t))
(
(r + π)L˜(t)− πH˜(t)− ru˜L(t)
)
+ CH(L˜(t), H˜(t))
(
rH˜(t)− rbu˜L(t)
)
≤ CL(L˜(t), H˜(t))
(
(r + π)L˜(t)− πH˜(t)− ru˜L(t)
)
+ CH(L˜(t), H˜(t))
dH˜(t)
dt
=
dC(L˜(t), H˜(t))
dt
.
12H(·) is differentiable except for a possible downward jump at t = 0 if H(0) is too large. The possible
jump does not affect the following claim that f(·) is a constant as it does not change the value of the
cost function.
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Since we allow for discrete jumps in H˜(·), we prove (27) in Lemma 12 in the Appendix
without assuming the differentiability of H˜. It follows from the HJB equation (14) that
f ′(T ) ≥ e−(r+π)T
(
πc(H˜(T )) + rc˜L(T )− CL
dL˜(T )
dT
− CH
(
rH˜(T )− rbu˜L(T )
))
−e−(r+π)T (r + π)X(T )
≥ e−(r+π)T
(
πc(H˜(T )) + rc˜L(T )− CL
dL˜(T )
dT
− CH
(
rH˜(T )− rbu˜L(T )
))
−e−(r+π)T (r + π)C(L˜(t), H˜(t))
≥ 0, a.e.
The absolute continuity of f and the nonnegativity of f ′(·) imply that f is increasing in
T . Therefore, for all T ,
C (L,H) = f(0) ≤ f(T )
≤
∫ T
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H˜(t)) + rc˜L(t)
)
dt+ e−(r+π)TC(L˜(T ), H˜(T )).
Taking limit T →∞ and applying Lemma 11 yield
C (L,H) ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H˜(t)) + rc˜L(t)
)
dt. (28)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: We show that M ((cˆx0)′(1), 1) is monotonically decreasing
in the initial condition x0. M (cˆ
′(x), x) can be rewritten as
(1−̟) max
LˆL,HˆL
{
1
ρ
(
LˆL + 1
)
+ (cˆx0)′(x)x
(
LˆL + 1
)
− C(LˆL, HˆL) + cˆ
x0(x)
}
+̟ max
LˆH,HˆH
{
1
ρ
(
LˆH + 1
)
+ (cˆx0)′(x)x
(
LˆH + 1
)
−
(cˆx0)′(x)
̟
(HˆH + x)
−C(LˆH, HˆH) + cˆ
x0(x)
}
. (29)
When x = 1, the first maximization problem is
max
LˆL,HˆL
{
1
ρ
(
LˆL + 1
)
+ (cˆx0)′(1)
(
LˆL + 1
)
− C(LˆL, HˆL) + cˆ
x0(1)
}
= max
LˆL
{
1
ρ
(
LˆL + 1
)
+ (cˆx0)′(1)
(
LˆL + 1
)
− c(LˆL)
}
− cˆx0(x0) + cˆ
x0(1).
The optimal LˆL is
LˆL = −
1
1 + ρ(cˆx0)′(1)
> −1. (30)
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Both cˆx0(1) and (cˆx0)′(1) decrease in the initial condition x0. It follows from
(
LˆL + 1
)
>
0 and the Envelope theorem that maxLˆL
{
1
ρ
(
LˆL + 1
)
+ (cˆx0)′(1)
(
LˆL + 1
)
− c(LˆL)
}
in-
creases in (cˆx0)′(1) and hence decreases in x0. Further, cˆ
x0(1) − cˆx0(x0) decreases with
x0, because all solutions are ordered by x0. Therefore, the maximized value in the first
problem decreases with x0.
When x = 1, the second maximization problem is
max
LˆH,HˆH
{
1
ρ
(
LˆH + 1
)
+ (cˆx0)′(1)
(
LˆH + 1
)
−
(cˆx0)′(1)
̟
(HˆH + 1)− C(LˆH, HˆH) + cˆ
x0(1)
}
.
We first show that the optimal solution is on the boundary (i.e., satisfies LˆH = HˆH).
Suppose not, the first-order conditions for an interior solution are
CL(LˆH, HˆH) =
1
ρ
+ (cˆx0)′(1) = CL(−1,−1), (31)
CH(LˆH, HˆH) = −
(cˆx0)′(1)
̟
< CH(−1,−1). (32)
Equation (31) and dCL(t)
dt
= 0 (proven in Lemma 10) imply that (LˆH, HˆH) is on a path
that eventually reaches (−1,−1). This contradicts with (32) and dCH (t)
dt
< 0 (proven in
Lemma 10). Therefore, impose LˆH = HˆH and rewrite the second maximization problem
as
max
LˆH
{
1
ρ
(
LˆH + 1
)
+ (cˆx0)′(1)
(
LˆH + 1
)
−
(cˆx0)′(1)
̟
(LˆH + 1)− c(LˆH)
}
.
The optimal LˆH satisfies
LˆH = −
1
1 + ρ(1− 1/̟)(cˆx0)′(1)
< −1. (33)
Hence the maximized value in the second problem increases in (cˆx0)′(1) and decreases in
x0.
We conclude that M ((cˆx0)′(1), 1) is monotonically decreasing in x0. Hence the can-
didate solution is unique. The existence proof follows easily from the intermediate value
theorem, and is omitted. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7: To simplify notation, we omit the superscript x∗∗ from cˆx
∗∗
(·)
in the proof. Choose a trajectory (L(t), H(t)) and let x(t) = H(t)
L(t)
. Since
CL(L,H) = −
1
ρL
−
cˆ′(x)x
L
,
CH(L,H) = −
cˆ′(x)
L
,
we can rewrite M (cˆ′(x(t)), x(t)) in (29) as
(1−̟) max
LL,HL
{C(L(t), H(t))− CL(L(t)− LL)− C(LL, HL)}
+̟ max
LH,HH
{
C(L(t), H(t))− CL(L(t)− LH)−
CH
̟
(H(t)−HH)− C(LH, HH)
}
.(34)
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Because dx
dt
> 0, it is equivalent to show that M (cˆ′(x(t)), x(t)) increases in t. Lemma
10 states that dCL(t)
dt
= 0 and dCH (t)
dt
< 0. Applying the Envelope theorem, we have
dM
dt
= (1−̟)
{
CL
dL(t)
dt
+ CH
dH(t)
dt
− CL
dL(t)
dt
}
+̟
{
CL
dL(t)
dt
+ CH
dH(t)
dt
− CL
dL(t)
dt
−
CH
̟
dH(t)
dt
−
1
̟
dCH(t)
dt
(H(t)−HH)
}
= −
dCH(t)
dt
(H(t)−HH) > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Conditional on a signal L, the low-income agent is
rewarded as (30) states that LˆL > −1. Conditional on a signal H, both agents are
punished as (33) states that LˆH = HˆH < −1.
The trajectory (L(t), H(t)) satisfies L(t) = H(t) when t ≥ N because dx
dt
> 0 when-
ever x < 1. The auditing arrival rate p can be solved from dL
dt
= dH
dt
at L = H , which
is
(r + π)L− πH − ruL − p ((1−̟)LL +̟LH − L)
= rH − rbuL − p (HH −H) .
Note that when L = H ,
HH −H
(1−̟)LL +̟LH − L
=
HˆH − (−1)
(1−̟)LˆL +̟LˆH − (−1)
=
1− 1
1+(1−1/̟)ρcˆ′(1)
1− (1−̟)
1+ρcˆ′(1)
− ̟
1+(1−1/̟)ρcˆ′(1)
=
1 + ρcˆ′(1)
ρcˆ′(1)
=
−1 + b
1+ρ(1−b)cˆ′(1)
−1 + 1
1+ρ(1−b)cˆ′(1)
=
−1 + buˆL
−1 + uˆL
=
rH − rbuL
(r + π)L− πH − ruL
.
Hence when L = H , p is (r+π)L−πH−ru
L
(1−̟)LL+̟LH−L
= rH−rbu
L
HH−H
> 0, which implies dL
dt
= dH
dt
= 0.
The state is stationary after N and before auditing arrives. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8: Given the initial promised utilities (L,H), we need to verify
that
(i) The cost of the contract implied by cˆx
∗∗
(·) is C(L,H).
(ii) The costs of other I.C. contracts are weakly higher than C(L,H).
We only verify (ii) here, since the proof for (i) can be obtained simply by replacing the
following inequalities with equalities.
Suppose that
{(
c˜H(t), c˜L(t), p˜(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is an I.C. contract. The proof that shows
equation (28) in subsection 2.2.2 can be used to prove that
C (L,H) ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t−
∫ t
0
p(ξ)dξ
(
πc(H˜(t)) + rc˜L(t)
+p(t)((1−̟)C(L˜L(t), H˜L(t)) +̟C(L˜H(t), H˜H(t)) + γ)
)
dt.
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The above can be equivalently rewritten as
C (L,H) ≤ E
[∫ τ1
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H˜(t)) + rc˜L(t)
)
dt
]
+E
[
e−rτ1γ
]
+ E
[
e−rτ1C(L˜(τ1), H˜(τ1))
]
,
where τ1 is the first auditing time and (L˜(τ1), H˜(τ1)) is the after-auditing state vector
contingent on the signal at τ1 (i.e., it is either (L˜L, H˜L) or (L˜H, H˜H)). Inductively, we
obtain
C (L,H) ≤ E
[∫ τn
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H˜(t)) + rc˜L(t)
)
dt
]
+E
[
n∑
i=1
e−rτiγ
]
+ E
[
e−rτnC(L˜(τn), H˜(τn))
]
,
where τn be the n-th auditing time. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
limn→∞ τn =∞ almost surely (otherwise the principal audits infinitely many times and
the auditing cost is infinity). Hence taking limit n → ∞ in the above and applying
Lemma 11 yield
C (L,H) ≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H˜(t)) + rc˜L(t)
)
dt
]
+ E
[
∞∑
i=1
e−rτiγ
]
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9: If H
L
≤ x∗∗, it is easy to show thatM(P ) > C(L,H) because
P ((1−̟)C(LL, HL) +̟C(LH, HH) + γ) + (1− P )C
(
L¯, H¯
)
> P ((1−̟)C(LL, x
∗∗LL) +̟C(LH, x
∗∗LH) + γ) + (1− P )C
(
L¯, x∗∗L¯
)
≥ C(L,H) + Pγ.
In the rest of the proof, we assume that H
L
> x∗∗. Because C(L,H) is strictly convex in
{(L,H) : L < 0, x∗∗ ≤ H
L
≤ 1}, the optimal solution to (24) is unique and it is denoted
as LL(P ), HL(P ), LH(P ), HH(P ), L¯(P ), H¯(P ).
First, we show that the objective M(P ) is a strictly convex function of P . Suppose
θ ∈ (0, 1) and P = θP1 + (1− θ)P2, P1 6= P2. Then construct a solution for the problem
M(P ) as follows,
(L˜L, H˜L) =
θP1
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
(LL(P1), HL(P1)) +
(1− θ)P2
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
(LL(P2), HL(P2)) ,
(L˜H, H˜H) =
θP1
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
(LH(P1), HH(P1)) +
(1− θ)P2
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
(LH(P2), HH(P2)) ,
(L¯, H¯) =
θ(1− P1)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
(
L¯(P1), H¯(P1)
)
+
(1− θ)(1− P2)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
(
L¯(P2), H¯(P2)
)
.
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The strict convexity of C(L,H) implies that
M(P )
≤ P
(
(1−̟)C(L˜L, H˜L) +̟C(L˜H, H˜H) + γ
)
+ (1− P )C(L¯, H¯)
< P (1−̟)
(
θP1
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
C (LL(P1), HL(P1)) +
(1− θ)P2
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
C (LL(P2), HL(P2))
)
+P̟
(
θP1
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
C (LH(P1), HH(P1)) +
(1− θ)P2
θP1 + (1− θ)P2
C (LH(P2), HH(P2))
)
+(1− P )
(
θ(1− P1)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
C(L¯(P1), H¯(P1))
+
(1− θ)(1− P2)
θ(1− P1) + (1− θ)(1− P2)
C(L¯(P2), H¯(P2))
)
+ Pγ
= θ
(
P1 ((1−̟)C (LL(P1), HL(P1)) +̟C(LH(P1), HH(P1)) + γ) + (1− P1)C(L¯(P1), H¯(P1))
)
+(1− θ)
(
P2 ((1−̟)C (LL(P2), HL(P2)) +̟C(LH(P2), HH(P2)) + γ)
+(1− P2)C
(
L¯(P2), H¯(P2)
) )
= θM(P1) + (1− θ)M(P2).
Second, we show that M(P ) > C(L,H) = M(0) for all P > 0. Because M(P ) is
strictly convex, it is sufficient to prove that M ′(0) ≥ 0. To finish the proof, we will show
that
M ′(0) = γ −M (cˆ′(x), x) ≥ 0, where x =
H
L
.
Denote the Lagrangian multipliers on constraints (25) and (26) as ξL(P ) and ξH(P ),
respectively. Then the first-order conditions are
M ′(P ) =
(
(1−̟)C(LL(P ), HL(P )) +̟C(LH(P ), HH(P )) + γ − C(L¯(P ), H¯(P ))
)
−
(
ξL(P )((1−̟)LL(P ) +̟LH(P )− L¯(P )) + ξH(P )(HH(P )− H¯(P ))
)
,
ξL(P ) = CL(LL(P ), HL(P )) = CL(LH(P ), HH(P )) = CL
(
L¯(P ), H¯(P )
)
,
0 = CH(LL(P ), HL(P )),
ξH(P )
̟
= CH(LH(P ), HH(P )), ξH(P ) = CH(L¯(P ), H¯(P )).
Since limP→0 L¯(P ) = L, limP→0 H¯(P ) = H , the above first-order conditions imply
lim
P↓0
M ′(P ) = ((1−̟)C(LL, HL) +̟C(LH, HH) + γ − C(L,H))
− (CL(L,H)((1−̟)LL +̟LH − L) + CH(L,H)(HH −H))
= γ −M (cˆ′(x), x),
where the second equality follows from (34). Q.E.D.
Lemma 10 When H > L, the trajectories implied by the candidate solution satisfy
dL
dt
< 0, dH
dt
< 0, dCL
dt
= 0, dCH
dt
< 0.
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Proof of Lemma 10:
(i) dL
dt
= (r + π − πx− ruˆL)L < 0, because x < 1, uˆL = 1
1+cˆ′(x)ρ(x−b)
< 1 and L < 0.
(ii) H = Lx decreases with t because L < 0 decreases and x > 0 increases with t.
(iii) It follows from C(L,H) = c(L) + cˆ(x) that CH =
cˆ′(x)
L
, CL = −
1
ρL
− cˆ
′(x)x
L
. Hence
dCH
dt
=
dcˆ′(x)
dt
L− cˆ′(x)(r + π − πx− ruˆL)L
L2
=
(
π
ρ
( 1
x
− 1) + cˆ′(x)(r + 2π − ruˆL − 2πx)
)
L− cˆ′(x)(r + π − πx− ruˆL)L
L2
=
π(1− x)
L
(
1
ρx
+ cˆ′(x)
)
< 0.
(iv) Because CL = −
1
ρL
− CHx, we have
dCL
dt
=
(r + π − πx− ruˆL)L
ρL2
− CH(r(x− b)uˆ
L + π(x− 1)x)−
dCH
dt
x
=
r + π − πx− ruˆL − ρcˆ′(x)(r(x− b)uˆL + π(x− 1)x)
ρL
−
π(1− x)
L
(
1
ρx
+ cˆ′(x)
)
x
= 0.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 11 (i) In the model with no auditing, if the cost of an I.C. contract
{(
cH(t), cL(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is finite, then
lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)TC(L(T ), H(T )) = 0.
(ii) In the model with auditing, if the cost of an I.C. contract
{(
cH(t), cL(t), p(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is finite, then
lim
T→∞
E
[
e−rTC(L(T ), H(T ))
]
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 11: The proof for part (ii) is similar to part (i), but much simpler
because the distortion function cˆx
∗∗
(·) is bounded with auditing. In the following, we
only prove part (i).
Recall that the upper bound for cˆx
∗
(·) is
H (d¯(x), x)
=
1
r + π
(
−
1
ρ
(r + π − πx− ruˆL) + rc
(
−uˆL
)
+ πc(−x)
)
=
1
r + π
(
−
1
ρ
(r + π − πx− ruˆL) + rc
(
−
π(1− x)b
r(x− b)
)
+ πc(−x)
)
=
1
r + π
(
−
1
ρ
(r + π − πx− ruˆL) + rc
(
−
πb
r(x− b)
)
+ πc(−x)
)
−
r
ρ(r + π)
log(1− x).
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There is a lower bound for the costs of all I.C. contracts delivering (−1,−x). Since
all such contracts satisfy
−1 =
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πH(t) + ruL(t)
)
dt, (35)
−x ≥
∫ ∞
0
e−(r+π)t
(
πH(t) + rbuL(t)
)
dt, (36)
we may solve a relaxed problem in which only (35) and (36) are imposed. The cost c(x)
from this problem serves as a lower bound. If x < π+rb
r+π
, the constraint (36) is slack and
H(t) = uL(t) = −1, ∀t ≥ 0.
Otherwise, (36) binds and
H(t) =
r + π
π
b− x
1− b
, uL(t) =
r + π
r
x− 1
1− b
, ∀t ≥ 0.
Hence when x ∈ [π+rb
r+π
, 1),
c(x) =
π
r + π
c
(
r + π
π
b− x
1 − b
)
+
r
r + π
c
(
r + π
r
x− 1
1− b
)
=
π
r + π
c
(
r + π
π
b− x
1 − b
)
+
r
r + π
c
(
r + π
r
−1
1− b
)
−
r
ρ(r + π)
log(1− x).
It follows from the two bounds that H (d¯(x), x)− c(x) is bounded by some B > 0.
For any I.C. contract with finite cost, the promise-keeping constraint and finite cost
imply that
lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)TL(T ) = 0,
lim
T→∞
∫ ∞
T
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H(t)) + rcL(t)
)
dt = 0.
Then,
lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)T (c(L(T )) + cˆx
∗
(x(T )))
≤ lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)T
(
c(L(T )) + H (d¯(x), x)
)
≤ lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)T (c(L(T )) + c(x(T )) +B)
≤ lim
T→∞
∫ ∞
T
e−(r+π)t
(
πc(H(t)) + rcL(t)
)
dt+ lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)TB
= 0,
where the second inequality follows from the choice of B and the third inequality follows
from the fact that c(L(T )) + c(x(T )) is a lower bound for the cost of the continuation
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contract delivering (L(T ), L(T )x(T )). On the other hand,
lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)T (c(L(T )) + cˆx
∗
(x(T ))) ≥ lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)T c(L(T ))
≥ lim
T→∞
e−(r+π)T
L(T )
ρ
= 0.
We conclude that limT→∞ e
−(r+π)TC(L(T ), H(T )) = 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12 In the model with no auditing, if the cost of an I.C. contract
{(
cH(t), cL(t)
)
; t ≥ 0
}
is finite, then
X(T ) ≤ C(L(T ), H(T )), for all T ≥ 0, (37)
where
X(T ) ≡ C(L(0), H(0)) +
∫ T
0
CL(L(t), H(t))
(
(r + π)L(t)− πH(t)− ruL(t)
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
CH(L(t), H(t))
(
rH(t)− rbuL(t)
)
dt.
Proof of Lemma 12: Fix a T > 0. First we find a compact subset G of the
domain of the cost function that contains the path {(L(t), H(t)) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T}. Promise-
keeping constraint implies that L(·) is continuous in t. Finite cost of the contract implies
that max0≤t≤T x(t) < 1, because otherwise the lower bound in Lemma 11 implies that
the cost is infinity. Define
G ≡
{
(l, h) ∈ R2 : min
0≤t≤T
L(t) ≤ l ≤ max
0≤t≤T
L(t), 0 ≤
h
l
≤ max
0≤t≤T
x(t)
}
.
Because CL(·, ·) and CH(·, ·) are continuous functions, let M > 0 be an upper bound for
them on the compact set G. Uniform continuity on G states that for any ǫ > 0, there
exists a δ > 0, such that if |(l1, h1)− (l2, h2)| ≤ δ,
|CL(l1, h1)− CL(l2, h2)| ≤ ǫ, |CH(l1, h1)− CH(l2, h2)| ≤ ǫ.
Second, we show that both L(·) and H(·) are of bounded variation on [0, T ]. L(·) is
absolutely continuous, hence it has bounded variation. Incentive constraints imply that
V +(T ) = sup
{
n−1∑
i=1
(H(ti+1)−H(ti))
+ : {t1, ..., tn} is a partition of [0, T ]
}
is finite. Because H(·) is a bounded function, it follows from H(T )−H(0) = V +(T )−
V −(T ) that V −(T ) is also finite. Hence H(·) has bounded variation.
Third, we choose a partition {t1, ..., tn}, 0 = t1 < t2 < ... < tn = T of [0, T ] that
is fine enough such that in any interval [ti, ti+1], either the total variations of L(·) and
H(·) are less than δ (then [ti, ti+1] is called a type 1 interval), or H(·) has a discrete
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jump bigger than δ (called a type 2 interval). Further, the total variation excluding the
discrete jumps in all the type 2 intervals can be made less than ǫ. Then
C(L(T ), H(T ))− C(L(0), H(0))
=
n−1∑
i=1
C(L(ti+1), H(ti+1))− C(L(ti), H(ti))
=
n−1∑
i=1
CL(Li, Hi)(L(ti+1)− L(ti)) + CH(Li, Hi)(H(ti+1)−H(ti)),
where Li ∈ [L(ti), L(ti+1)] and Hi ∈ [H(ti), H(ti+1)] exist because of the mean value
theorem. Hence
n−1∑
i=1
CL(Li, Hi)(L(ti+1)− L(ti)) + CH(Li, Hi)(H(ti+1)−H(ti))
≥
∑
i∈ type 1
∫ ti+1
ti
(
CL(Li, Hi)dL(t) + CH(Li, Hi)
(
rH(t)− rbuL(t)
)
dt
)
− 2Mǫ
≥
∑
i∈ type 1
∫ ti+1
ti
((
sup
t∈[ti,ti+1]
CL(L(t), H(t))− ǫ
)
dL(t)
+
(
sup
t∈[ti,ti+1]
CH(L(t), H(t))− ǫ
)(
rH(t)− rbuL(t)
)
dt
)
− 2Mǫ
≥
n−1∑
i=1
∫ ti+1
ti
((
sup
t∈[ti,ti+1]
CL(L(t), H(t))− ǫ
)
dL(t)
+
(
sup
t∈[ti,ti+1]
CH(L(t), H(t))− ǫ
)(
rH(t)− rbuL(t)
)
dt
)
− 2Mǫ− 2(M + ǫ)ǫ
≥
∫ T
0
(
CL(L(t), H(t))dL(t) + CH(L(t), H(t))
(
rH(t)− rbuL(t)
)
dt
)
−ǫ(L(T )− L(0))− ǫ
∫ T
0
(
rH(t)− rbuL(t)
)
dt− 2Mǫ − 2(M + ǫ)ǫ.
Since the inequality holds for all ǫ > 0, (37) is true. Q.E.D.
Lemma 13 Assume CRRA preferences and the same auditing technology as in Section
3. The optimal auditing probability is close to zero when L0 is either extremely high or
extremely low.
Proof of Lemma 13: When L0 is high, consider a no-auditing I.C. contract in which
cH(t) and cL(t) are independent of t, cH − cL = wH − wL and
ru(cL) + πu(cH)
r + π
= L0.
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The difference between the cost of this contract, rc
L+πcH
r+π
, and that of the full-information
constant consumption, c(L0), is the risk premium, which can be easily verified to ap-
proach zero when L0 → ∞ because the absolute risk aversion approaches zero. Hence
the principal does not need to audit with large probability when L0 is large.
The lowest utility that the principal may deliver to the agent is L ≡ ru(0)+πu(wH−wL)
r+π
.
This is because the agent’s consumption must be non-negative and, hence, the high-
income agent can consume at least wH − wL by underreporting.
When L0 is close to L, consider again the above no-auditing I.C. contract in which
cH − cL = wH − wL and
ru(cL) + πu(cH)
r + π
= L0.
Because cL ≈ 0, the cost of this no-auditing contract, rc
L+πcH
r+π
, is close to π(wH−wL)
r+π
,
which is a lower bound for the costs of all I.C. contracts. To see that π(wH−wL)
r+π
is a lower
bound, note that the high-income agent’s continuation utility must be greater than or
equal to u(wH − wL), as the low-income agent’s consumption must be non-negative.
Hence the principal does not need to audit with large probability when L0 is close to L.
Q.E.D.
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